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I. Introduction 
 
The relationship between monopoly power and the business cycle has been a topic of interest 
for macroeconomics for many years. Papers such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and 
Gali (1994) have addressed this from a neo-classical theory perspective. These papers 
concentrate on the relationship between the price-cost mark-up and the business cycle and 
argue that there is a complex bi-directional relationship between the ability of firms to price 
above marginal cost and the overall level of economic activity. There has also been a long 
running theme in the Kaleckian tradition which has seen monopoly power as central to 
explaining key macroeconomic features such business cycles and the distribution of income. 
Examples of this are Kalecki (1938) and Cowling (1982). A central theme of all this work is 
that market power is the norm rather than the exception for developed economies. Ultimately 
this is an empirical question which has been addressed in a number of different ways. The 
aim of this paper is to examine whether Hall’s (1988) approach to testing for market power 
offers insights for the UK economy. In particular, we examine whether this approach detects 
deviations from competition similar to those detected by Hall for the US economy. 
 
Empirical work in this area is made difficult because the direction of causality between 
monopoly power and economic activity is not clear. However, a notable contribution is that 
of Hall (1988) who uses sectoral data to test for the existence of market power at both the 
one-digit and two-digit levels for the US economy. This paper establishes a strong case for 
the importance of imperfect competition across a wide range of US industry with significant 
implications for the cyclical relationship between output and employment. In particular, his 
tests rely on the fact that labour input varies much less than output in response to business 
cycle fluctuations. More recent work by Afonso and Costa (2013) and Afonso and Jalles 
(2016) has demonstrated that the relationship between the price-cost mark-up and changes in 
output depends on whether output changes are the result of demand or supply shocks. 
 
II. The Model 
 
We assume a representative imperfectly competitive firm with production function: 
 
 ( ),tt t tQ Ae F N Kθ=  (1) 
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where Q is output, N and K are labour and capital inputs respectively, F is a constant returns 
production function and θ  is the exogenous rate of Hicks neutral technical progress. The 
marginal cost of production is given by: 
 
 w dN r dKc
dQ Qθ
+
=
−
 (2) 
 
where w and r are the marginal user costs of labour and capital and the prefix d indicates a 
small increment in a variable. Under constant returns to scale wN rK cQ+ = . Using this 
property and defining the price-cost mark-up as /p cµ =  and  labour’s share in total revenue 
as /wN pQα =  allows us to write: 
 
 ( )1 1dQ wN dN wN dK dN dK
Q cQ N cQ K N K
θ µα µα θ
 
= + − + = + − + 
 
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which can, in turn, be rewritten as: 
 
 ( ) ( )1 1dQ dN dK dN dK
Q N K N K
α α µ α θ − − − = − − + 
 
 (4) 
 
The left-hand side of (4) is the conventionally measured Solow residual or the rate of growth 
of total factor productivity. Under competition 1µ =  and therefore (4) would yield the 
standard result that total factor productivity growth is driven solely by the exogenous rate of 
technical progress.  If, however, firms possess some degree of monopoly power then 1µ >  
and total factor productivity growth is positively related to the growth rate of the labour-
capital ratio. Note that, in the presence of market power, the Solow residual is not 
synonymous with the rate of Hicks neutral technical progress, even when the production 
function exhibits constant returns to scale. 
 
Let us define ty  as the Solow residual and tx  as the rate of change of the labour-capital ratio. 
Next, assume that the rate of technical progress is a stationary random variable such that 
t tuθ θ= +  where θ  is the mean rate of technical progress and tu  is a random variable. We 
also introduce a t subscript for the mark-up ratio µ  to allow for the possibility of a time-
varying mark-up as discussed by Hall (1988). Taken together these modifications enable us to 
write equation (4) as: 
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 ( )1t t t t ty x uµ α θ= − + +  (5) 
 
This takes the form of a standard regression equation with the intercept being equal to the rate 
of exogenous technical progress and the slope coefficient being a function of the price-cost 
mark-up and labour’s share in marginal cost. If the mark-up and labour share were fixed then 
estimation of (5) would provide a direct test for imperfect competition.  
 
III. The Data 
 
The estimates in this paper are based on output, employment and capital services data at the 
level of industrial sectors. The sectors considered are Agriculture; Mining and Quarrying, 
Manufacturing; Construction; Electricity, Gas and Water and Services. Together, these 
comprise the whole of UK GDP. This level of aggregation was chosen because it was 
possible to obtain long-runs of annual data at this level whereas lower levels of aggregation 
proved to be problematic because of missing data and a number of changes in the industrial 
classification system over the period considered. 
 
Output data for 1990-2015 were taken from the ONS website. These are constant value 
measures expressed in index form. Longer time series were obtained by splicing these to the 
1948-1998 indices of Gross Value Added by category of output given in the Economic 
Trends Annual Supplement for 1999 (Table 1.9). Consistent long runs of data for labour input 
are harder to obtain. Ideally, we would like to use an input measure based on hours but this 
proved impossible and instead we rely on data for numbers of employees /jobs. Prior to 1978 
the data are based the assumption that each individual worker is based solely in one sector. 
Post 1978 the data are based on workforce jobs rather than individual workers. This means 
that individual workers can be counted multiple times if they hold more than one job and can 
also be counted in more than one sector. Since the post 1978 data is more reliable, we use this 
as the basis for the employment measure and splice this to data for employment by sector 
taken from the Annual Abstract for Statistics for various years. Even here, there are a number 
of breaks within the series due to changes in the Standard Industrial Classification. The 
employment data therefore consist of actual numbers of workforce jobs post 1978 but the pre-
1978 figures are best thought of as an index with the 1978 figure acting as a base. Despite 
these caveats, we feel that the employment data give a reasonable indication of long-term 
trends in the distribution of employment between sectors as well as the year on year changes 
in employment by sector.  
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The mean growth rates of output and employment by sector are shown in Table 1 along with 
their standard deviations. These calculations are illustrative of some well-known trends in the 
UK economy in that they indicate a general increase in output across all sectors (with the 
exception of Mining and Quarrying) but a shift in employment from the traditional 
production sectors towards the service sector. 
 
The capital input series used here are sectoral estimates taken from the ONS website. These 
are described by the ONS as “tak(ing) account of quality and use of the capital stock across 
time and different types of asset”.  We believe this gives a better measure of capital input than 
the traditional capital stock measure (calculated by accumulating gross fixed investment) 
since it attempts to capture the flow of capital services rather than simply the level of 
installed capital. However, there are some associated problems. In particular, the ONS gives  
a combined capital services index for Agriculture and Mining. Also, the figures for Services 
are divided into a number of sub-categories. There is nothing we can do about the first 
problem but the Services indices have been combined into a single weighted index using 
weights derived as the share in employment taken from the input-output tables obtained from 
the ONS website. Note that average capital service growth is positive across all sectors – 
even the declining Mining and Quarrying sector. Note also, that the ONS capital services 
index is quite volatile in comparison with measures based on installed capital stock. 
 
In addition to the descriptive statistics shown in Table 1, we have also investigated the 
relationship between the different sectors using the correlation coefficients shown in Table 2. 
Figures in bold indicate the correlation of year on year changes in output while the figures in 
italics give the correlation in the Solow residuals. These estimates indicate important linkages 
between the Manufacturing, Construction and Services sectors with strong positive 
correlations between annual changes of output within these sectors and rather lower, but still 
positive, correlations between their Solow residuals. 
 
IV. Testing for monopoly power 
 
If tµ  and tα  were fixed constants, then equation (5) would offer a simple test for the 
existence of monopoly power through a simple regression of the Solow residual on the rate of 
change of the capital-labour ratio. Under competition the slope coefficient should be zero 
whereas, in the presence of market power, it will be positive. However, there is no guarantee 
that these parameters will be fixed. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that changes in 
the capital-labour ratio may be correlated with random changes to productivity which would 
imply that estimates of the slope coefficient would be both biased and inconsistent. Hall 
(1988) proposes an alternative test based on an instrumental variable approach. Let tz  be an 
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instrumental variable with the properties ( )cov , 0t tu z = and ( )cov , 0t tx z ≠  . The covariance 
is estimated by performing an instrumental variable regression of the form (5) with the test 
statistic being the t-ratio for the slope coefficient. Under the joint assumptions that 1tµ =  and 
there are constant returns to scale then the covariance of the Solow residual and the 
instrument is equal to zero. We can test this by estimating (5) by the method of instrumental 
variables and testing the restriction that the slope coefficient is equal to zero.  Note that the 
data used in all regressions are annual percentage changes in the relevant variables. Although 
the original series are integrated of order 1, the use of percentage changes means that the 
variables in the regression equations are stationary. 
 
In practice we use three instruments: the rate of change of US Gross Domestic Product, the 
rate of change of UK Exports and the rate of change of US Exports (all series in constant 
prices).  These were chosen on the basis that they are likely to be correlated with aggregate 
UK economic activity but not correlated with the error term in equation (5). The labour share 
α is measured as the ratio of compensation of employees to net value added which is taken 
from the UK input-output tables for 2013. Ideally, we would measure this ratio on an annual 
basis but such data are not available for the full time period. However, changes in α have a 
relatively minor effect on the Solow residual when compared with changes in the 
employment and capital inputs and we believe that the use of a fixed α estimate has very 
little effect on the results. The results, in the form of the p-values for the null hypothesis that 
the slope coefficient is equal to zero, are presented in Table 3. The estimates are for the 
period 1952 to 2014. The 2015 observation could not be used because our real US export 
series ended in 2014. Our results show rejection of the null hypothesis for the Manufacturing 
and Services sectors  however, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for any of the other cases 
considered. Taken together, the Manufacturing and Services sectors account for more than 
90% of total employment in the UK and therefore our evidence is consistent with the view 
that imperfect competition (or possibly increasing returns to scale) is a widespread 
phenomenon for UK economic activity. 
 
It should be noted that our results may be sensitive to the problem of weak instruments. To 
test for this we present the F-statistic from a first stage regression of the right-hand side 
variable on a constant and the three instruments. Under the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are not significant this statistic is distributed as 3,60F and the 5% critical value is 
2.758. We do not reject the null in any of the cases examined here. On this basis, the failure 
to reject the null of  1tµ =  may reflect the use of weak instruments rather than genuinely 
competitive markets. 
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If we assume that the mark-up ratio µ  is constant, then it is possible to estimate it using 
equation (5). However, Hall (1988) recommends estimating its reciprocal using a two-stage 
least squares regression of the reverse regression. This is because the instruments will tend to 
be more correlated with ( )/q k∆ than ( )/n k∆ when there is either labour hoarding or 
overhead labour is important (cf. Hall (1988) p. 934) for a fuller explanation). The reverse 
regression is therefore likely to produce more precise estimates when two-stage least squares 
is applied. Table 4 reports estimates of the slope coefficient from a reverse regression along 
with estimates of the implied mark-up ratio. The results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the mark-up ratio is significantly greater than one in both the manufacturing and services 
sectors. Adjustment for serial correlation in the case of manufacturing produces virtually no 
change in the point estimate of the slope coefficient or its standard error.  Note that this 
approach also allows us to calculate an indirect estimate of the rate of Hicks neutral technical 
progress θ  which is positive in all cases except for the Electricity, Gas and Water regression. 
It can also be noted that the use of the reciprocal regression provides a partial solution to the 
problem of weak instruments in that the F-test for instrument validity now rejects the null for 
the Manufacturing and Services sectors. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
This paper has applied Hall’s (1988) methodology to investigate the possible existence of 
market power in UK industry. The estimates presented in this paper are consistent with Hall 
in that we find evidence of market power in some sectors but not in others. However, it 
should be emphasised that the results are conditional on the assumption of constant returns to 
scale. Finally, it should be noted that market power is most evident in the manufacturing and 
services sectors which together account for a large fraction of overall output. 
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Agriculture Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Construction 
Electricity, 
Gas and Water Services 
Output Growth 
Mean 1.85 -1.57 1.25 1.64 2.88 2.51 
SD 5.81 7.10 3.82 4.85 4.54 1.43 
Employment Growth 
Mean -1.55 -3.80 -1.41 0.23 -0.39 1.30 
SD 4.28 6.68 3.05 3.48 3.69 1.60 
Capital Services Growth 
Mean 2.81 2.81 2.03 4.16 2.92 4.53 
SD 4.03 4.03 2.42 2.87 2.61 1.93 
Solow Residual 
Mean 0.90 -2.80 1.54 -0.39 1.14 -0.19 
SD 6.41 7.81 3.12 4.01 5.08 1.50 
Employment Weight α   0.4269 0.2396 0.6762 0.5433 0.3603 0.5675 
 
Table 1: Sample Statistics – Annual Percentage Changes 1952-2015 
(Employment weights are 2014 shares in net output) 
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 Agriculture 
Mining and 
Quarrying Manufacturing Construction 
Electricity, 
Gas and 
Water 
Services 
Agriculture 1.00      
Mining and 
Quarrying 
-0.12 
-0.01 1.00     
Manufacturing 0.05 0.04 
-0.09 
0.03 1.00    
Construction 0.22 0.20 
0.01 
0.13 
0.61 
0.38 1.00   
Electricity, 
Gas and Water 
-0.35 
-0.24 
0.23 
0.27 
0.14 
0.04 
0.03 
0.08 1.00  
Services -0.02 -0.03 
0.07 
0.08 
0.63 
0.30 
0.55 
0.33 
0.11 
0.05 1.00 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix – Annual Percentage Changes 1952-2015 
Figures in bold show correlation of output changes, figures in italics show correlation of Solow residuals. 
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 Slope Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
F-statistic for 
instruments 
regression 
Agriculture 0.1387 0.5329 0.7955 1.36 
Mining and Quarrying 0.1298 1.1480 0.9103 0.24 
Manufacturing 1.9439 0.9573 0.0467* 1.55 
Construction 0.8935 0.5600 0.1157 1.60 
Electricity, Gas and Water -0.6129 0.7962 0.4451 1.00 
Services 1.0317 0.5037 0.0448* 1.61 
 
Table 3: Test  for null hypothesis of a zero covariance between the Solow residual and the 
equation instruments (* indicates significance at the 5% level). Annual data 1952-2014. 
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Intercept 
Estimate 
0βˆ  
Slope 
Estimate 
1ˆβ  
Durbin-
Watson 
Statistic 
F-test for weak 
instruments 
Implied Mark-
up Ratio 
( )1ˆˆ 1 1/µ β α= +  
Implied rate of 
technical 
progress 
0 1
ˆ ˆ ˆθ β β= −  
Agriculture -4.6678 (1.11) 
0.3684 
(0.89) 1.34 0.45 7.36 1.72 
Mining and Quarrying -1.8454 (24.80) 
1.6004 
(8.02) 1.22 0.02 3.61 2.95 
Manufacturing -4.2410 (0.5675) 
0.4753 
(0.24) 1.08 9.85 4.11 2.02 
Construction -3.4460 (0.66) 
0.9273 
(0.58) 1.44 1.44 2.98 3.20 
Electricity, Gas and Water -1.8269 (1.63) 
-1.0582 
(1.20) 1.60 0.31 -1.62 -1.93 
Services -3.0135 (0.27) 
0.8400 
(0.43) 1.55 3.97 3.10 2.53 
 
Table 4:Estimates of the mark-up ratio using TSLS estimates of the reciprocal regression 
(Standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficient estimates) 
 
 
